This paper examines whether the governance of regulatory agencies -regulatory governance -is positively related to financial sector soundness. We model regulatory governance and financial stability as latent variables, using a structural equation modeling approach. We include a broad range of variables potentially relevant to financial stability, employing aggregate regulatory, banking and financial, macroeconomic and institutional environment data for a sample of 55 countries over a period from 2001 to 2005. Given the growing importance of macro-prudential analysis, we use the IMF's financial soundness indicators, a relatively new body of economic statistics which focuses on the banking sector as a whole. Our empirical evidence indicates that regulatory governance has a beneficial influence on financial stability. Thus, our findings support the view that the improvement of regulatory governance arrangements should be a building block of financial reform***.
Introduction
The literature claims that good regulatory governance enhances the ability of the financial system to withstand unsound market practices and the occurrence of moral hazard and hence improves system-wide risk management capabilities, whereas dysfunctional government arrangements are supposed to undermine the credibility of the regulatory authority and lead to the spread of unsound practices, jeopardizing the stability of the financial system (Das et al., 2004) . Quintyn (2007) argues that weak regulatory governance promotes weak financial sector governance in general, which in turn impairs the smooth functioning of the financial system, curbing economic performance and growth. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1997; has recognized the importance of independence and accountability for regulatory authorities by including these two governance arrangements in the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP). This paper is motivated by the fact that many regulatory authorities lacked the mandate, sufficient resources and independence to effectively contain systemic risk and to implement early action in the runup to the recent financial crisis (see, e.g., Claessens et al., 2010) . Many commentators view governance failures as a key contributing factor to the global financial crisis. The evidence provided by Levine (2010) indicates that regulatory agencies apparently were aware of the build-up of risk in the financial sector associated with their policies, but chose not to modify those policies. Mian et al. (2010) lend support to this finding by showing that vested interests influenced the financial sector policy-making of the US government in the wake of the financial crisis. Igan et al. (2009) find that financial institutions which lobbied more intensely originated mortgages with higher loan-to-income ratios, securitized more intensively and had faster growing mortgage loan portfolios.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the influence of regulatory governance on financial stability, taking into account a broad range of control variables. So far, the evidence on the impact of regulatory governance on financial stability is rather inconclusive (see Quintyn, 2007; Mohr and Wagner, 2012) . We model financial stability and the governance of regulatory authorities as latent variables, using a structural equation modeling approach. The objective of our empirical analysis is twofold: first, to test whether the data patterns can be fitted within the data sample and second, to provide cross-country evidence on the relationship between regulatory governance and financial stability.
This methodological approach is basically motivated by three aspects (also see Borio, 2004 ; Mohr and Wagner, 2012) . First, it is not entirely clear what constitutes a good regulatory framework that promotes bank development, efficiency, and stability. Second, due to a lack of theoretical guidance, any construction of an index that tries to capture regulatory governance arrangements relies on some degree of judgment. Evidently, this is reflected in the wide range of different proxies used for capturing regulatory governance. Most importantly, because there is no widely accepted measure, quantification or time series for measuring financial stability (see, e.g., Segoviano and Goodhart, 2009 ), similar difficulties relate to the variable that should proxy financial stability.
We think that our approach has several advantages over methods used in the existing literature (see section 2) . A structural equation model can provide information about the relationship between variables which have causes and effects that are observable but which cannot themselves be directly measured or are difficult to measure, respectively (see, e.g., Breusch, 2005) . Furthermore, global fit measures can provide a summary evaluation of complex models that involve a large number of linear equations. Other methodologies like multiple regressions would provide only separate "mini-tests" of model components conducted on an equation-by-equation basis (Tomarken and Waller, 2005) . Most importantly, the structural equation modeling methodology allows for a number of indicators reflecting different dimensions of multidimensional variables such as financial stability or regulatory governance, enabling a better estimation. By this we avoid the problem of choosing appropriate weights, a problem typically encountered when using aggregate measures or composite indicators.
The contribution to the related literature is threefold: to our knowledge, we are the first to model regulatory governance and financial stability as latent variables, using a structural equation modeling approach. Furthermore, we investigate the relationship between regulatory governance and financial stability by using the IMF's financial soundness indicators -a relatively new body of economic statistics. Finally, we consider a broader range of indicators capturing regulatory governance or aspects thereof.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the stage by giving a short review of the related literature. Sections 3 describes the data and variables, section 4 introduces the empirical methodology. Section 5 presents the empirical results and section 6 concludes.
Related literature
The increasing popularity of regulatory governance as an economic concept can be attributed to financial liberalization and recent banking crises that have brought the discussion about the appropriate institutional framework for regulatory agencies to the forefront (Goodhart, 2007) . Goodhart (1998) as well as Das and Quintyn (2002) were among the first to emphasize the governance dimension of banking regulation. The theoretical literature advocates that regulatory and supervisory independence from the government and the financial industry is essential for the achievement and preservation of financial stability. Since regulatory authorities exercise important powers with distributional consequences they are subject to pressures from the financial sector and political interference (see, e.g., Quintyn and Taylor, 2003) . Furthermore, the involved interest groups -the regulatee (financial industry), politicians and regulatory agency officials -interact to maximize their ability to extract rents from economic activity (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) . However, to make the independence of regulatory authorities work, it has to be accompanied by accountability arrangements (see, e.g., Hüpkes et al., 2005) .
Anecdotal evidence indicates that insufficient banking regulation, weaknesses in supervision, government intervention in the regulatory process and connected lending play a central role in the explanation of banking crises during the last decades (see, e.g., Caprio and Klingebiel, 1997; Lindgren et al., 1999) . Rochet (2008) argues that many recent crises were largely amplified or even provoked by political interference, while the key to successful financial reform lies in ensuring the independence and accountability of regulatory authorities. According to Barth et al. (2003) , there are particularly three common practices that undermine regulatory governance. First, credit granted due to directed lending might not be justified under safe banking standards because it is more likely that it turns out to be non-performing. Such practices could undermine the credibility of the regulatory authority and the development of a sound loan base and consequently restrict economic growth. Second, government ownership of banks could threaten the stability of the banking system in a similar vein since the regulatory authority might not be allowed to apply regulatory standards to state-owned banks. Finally, the protection of weak regulations by politicians and government-encouraged regulatory forbearance are the most common types of undermining the integrity of the regulatory authority and exacerbating financial crises.
The empirical evidence on the impact of regulatory governance on financial stability is rather inconclusive. There is a broad division into two camps: while some studies support the claim of a positive relationship between regulatory governance and financial stability, the other strand of the empirical literature does not find that financial stability is related to regulatory governance or aspects thereof.
Recent research finding a positive influence of regulatory governance on financial stability includes Using the World Business Environment Survey, they approach the concept of financial stability by asking to which degree firms face obstacles in obtaining external finance. The results of their ordered probit regression show that a higher degree of regulatory independence seems to reduce the likelihood that politicians or the financial industry will capture the agency. Das et al. (2004) construct an index of regulatory governance based on the IMF's Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP). Banking sector stability is proxied by an index consisting of a weighted average of the capital adequacy ratio and the ratio of non-performing loans. Using a weighted least squares approach, their results suggest that regulatory governance has a positive impact on the stability of the banking sector. Ponce (2009) also uses data collected by the FSAP to capture regulatory governance arrangements but only uses the ratio of non-performing loans to proxy financial stability. The main findings of his linear regression are that regulatory independence significantly reduces the average probability of banks' loan default, and that legal protection and accountability seem to be of even more importance.
The second strand of empirical literature does not find that regulatory governance is associated with financial stability and comprises the work of Barth et al. (2004; Empirical studies that use an empirical approach that is similar to ours, but are concerned with a different research agenda are Giles and Tedds (2002) or Bajada and Schneider (2005) . These studies employ a structural equation modeling approach for estimating the size and development of the shadow economy or for testing the statistical relationships between the shadow economy and other economic variables. Other studies treat corruption as a latent variable that is directly related to its underlying causes (Dreher et al., 2007) . Only a small body of empirical literature has approached aspects of financial stability by using the structural equation modeling technique. Rose and Spiegel (2009; 2011) treat the recent financial crisis as a latent variable. They model the crisis as a combination of changes in real GDP, the stock market, country credit ratings and the exchange rate, simultaneously linking potential indicators of a financial crisis with potential causes of the crisis.
Determinants of financial stability: data and variables

Financial stability
Although academics and policy-makers have provided various definitions, financial stability still remains an elusive concept. So far, there is no consensus on what best describes the state of financial stability. Due to the interdependencies of different elements within a financial system as well as with the real economy, financial stability is a difficult concept to define (see Dattels et al., 2010) . Accordingly, there is no uniformly accepted definition of financial stability (for a survey see, e.g., Schinasi, 2006) .
In this paper, we will take a systemic view that emphasizes the resilience of the financial system (as a whole) to financial or real shocks so that it can perform its ability to facilitate and support the efficient functioning and performance of the economy. Thus, we adhere to Mishkin (1999, p.6) who argues that financial instability occurs "when shocks to the financial system interfere with information flows so that the financial system can no longer do its job of channeling funds to those with productive investment opportunities". Following Schinasi (2006, p. 83) , a "financial system is in a range of stability whenever it is capable of facilitating (…) the performance of an economy, and of dissipating financial imbalances that arise endogenously or as a result of significant adverse and unanticipated events".
Reflecting Of equal importance, the FSIs are designed to measure the stability of the financial system as a whole rather than the soundness of the individual financial institutions. The positions and flows between units within a group of financial institutions and between reporting financial institutions within the sector are eliminated. Hence, the FSIs do not represent simple aggregations or averages of financial institutions' data and differ considerably from most indicators used to proxy financial sector soundness in the relevant literature (Agresti et al, 2008) . To date, the only comparable body of statistical data that is collected in an equally systematic manner is the set of macroprudential indictors (MPIs) developed by the ECB (see Mörtinnen et al., 2005) . However, the primary geographical scope of the MPIs is the Euro area and the European Union so that they are not suited for our purposes as we want to base our empirical analysis on a highly diversified country sample -both from a geographical and a development point of view. Based on the difficulties in defining and measuring financial stability outlined above, we introduce the latent variable financial stability (finstab) which we are trying to capture by a range of indicator variables. We include 6 FSIs as observable indicator variables for 55 countries for the period between 2001 and 2005. The data sources and definitions are listed in table A.1 in the appendix; the country sample is given in table A.2. In order to obtain a sufficiently large sample, we mainly include FSIs from the FSI core set: Regulatory capital to riskweighted assets (regcap), Bank provisions to nonperforming loans (provtonpl), Return on assets (roa), Return on equity (roe) and Non-performing loans to total loans (npltotloan). Additionally, we include the bank capital to assets ratio (capass) from the encouraged set.
The data selection and the time frame are mainly driven by considerations of data availability. However, three qualifications are necessary. First, although the current set of FSIs is available for over 100 developed and developing economies, the country selection is primarily dictated by the availability of regulatory governance variables, to be discussed hereafter. Since research on regulatory governance is still in its early stages, some indices on independence and accountability of regulatory agencies are only available for a relatively small number of countries (see, e.g., Masciandaro et al., 2008) . As a result, even countries like the USA had to be omitted from the dataset.
Second, while we acknowledge that the international financial system was severely affected by the financial crisis that caused havoc on global credit and capital markets, it is precisely for this reason that we do not account for the period after 2005. Hence, the purpose for the cut-off point is to avoid structural breaks in the data. Otherwise, we expect great deviations in the estimation results to arise, as the majority of economic and financial data may have been heavily biased by the financial turbulences during the last few years.
Finally, while the IMF's core indicators only cover the deposit-taking sector, this does not pose a problem for the purpose of our empirical analysis. Although there is a trend to more arm's length financing (see, e.g., Rajan, 2006) , banks are still the main collectors of funds from and providers of finance to the corporate and household sectors (see, e.g., ECB, 2008). Furthermore, the adverse consequences of a contraction in lending on the real economy are well supported by the empirical literature (see, e.g., Lown and Morgan, 2006; Bayoumi and Melander, 2008) and the relationship between crises and recessions is subject of a sizable literature (e.g., Dell'Ariccia et al., 2008). Recent studies indicate that financial crises characterized by banking sector distress are more likely to be associated with severe and protracted downturns than financial turbulences originating from securities or foreign exchange markets (see, e.g., IMF, 2008). 
Regulatory governance
As it is the case with financial stability, the governance of regulatory authorities is an economic concept that consists of different dimensions and is difficult to measure. We introduce the latent variable regulatory governance (reggov) which we are trying to capture by a range of indices used in the relevant literature. We can only draw upon one value per variable because the most of the data were collected through surveys of government officials. However, no other dataset has the level of cross-country detail on bank regulations (for additional defenses see Beck et al., 2007) . The data sources and definitions for all following variables are listed in table A.1 in the appendix.
To begin with, we include several indicator variables that proxy the independence and accountability of regulatory authorities. Building on the pioneering work of Barth et al. (2004; we construct an indicator that indicates the degree of independence and accountability (indac). Furthermore, we build an indicator that reflects the degree to which regulatory agencies can demand financial institutions to disclose accurate information and induce private sector monitoring (seaudit). Such external audits represent means of an independent validation of regulatory information. A certain amount of transparency in the rule-making process and mechanisms for consultation with all parties involved can reduce the danger of regulatory capture and limit self-interests of regulators (Quintyn and Taylor, 2003) . Higher values indicate a higher degree of independence and accountability and a higher intensity of external audit, respectively. Furthermore, we include two indices taken from Masciandaro et al. (2008) that capture the degree of independence (supind) and accountability (supacc). Again, higher values indicate a higher degree of independence and accountability, respectively.
Finally, we consider two variables that reflect the degree of central bank independence. This is basically motivated by the fact that many central banks play a key role in the regulation and supervision of the banking system -particularly in emerging and developing countries. Entrusting banking regulation to the central bank can be considered as reasonable if one assumes that locating regulatory and supervisory functions inside the central bank allows regulatory authorities to "piggyback" and enjoy the same degree of autonomy (Arnone et al., 2009 ). Furthermore, there is some evidence that central bank independence is positively related to financial stability (see, e.g., Klomp and De Haan, 2009 ). We use the data on political central bank independence (cbpol) and economic central bank independence (cbeco) for 2003, collected by Arnone et al. (2009) .
While this paper focuses on the relationship between financial stability and regulatory governance, a substantial amount of literature suggests that the state of financial stability is determined by a plethora of variables. 3 In what follows, we also consider the structure of the banking sector, macroeconomic conditions and economic freedom as latent variables, to warrant the robustness of our empirical exercise.
Structure of banking sector
In addition to regulatory governance, we augment our structural equation model by including the structure of the banking sector (bankstruc) as a latent variable, under which we subsume indicator variables for the openness, competitiveness and ownership structure of the banking sector. Bank concentration (bnkconc) measures the share of banking system assets held by the three largest banks in an economy. A higher degree of consolidation could lead to less competition, higher profits and hence higher capital buffers. Furthermore, concentrated banking systems have larger banks with more diversified portfolios. On the other hand, a less competitive environment might involve higher risk-taking incentives and too-big-tofail policies (Beck et al., 2007) . The empirical evidence regarding the effects of a higher degree of banking concentration on the fragility of the banking sector is ambiguous (see, e.g., Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009 for a summary of the findings).
We include the variable foreign bank competition (forcomp) to proxy the foreign share of the banking sector assets as well as the degree of foreign bank entry. Although foreign-owned banks hit by an adverse shock might reduce their cross borderlending, leading to a withdrawal of capital (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2010) , an overwhelming body of evidence indicates that greater openness to foreign banks improves the soundness of the banking sector by transferring best practices, increasing credit supply and putting competitive pressure on domestic banks (see, e. Finally, we include Restrictiveness of Bank Activities (restrict), a widely used measure to indicate the degree to which banks are allowed to engage in securities, insurance and real estate markets. While the theoretical discussion centers around aspects of risk diversification, economies of scale and scope, and toobig-to-fail considerations (see, e.g., Claessens and Klingebiel, 2001 ), the empirical literature finds that a higher degree of restrictiveness has negative repercussions in form of a higher crisis probability (Beck et al., 2007) and lower banking efficiency (Barth et al., 2004; .
Macroeconomic conditions
The fourth latent variable we consider is what we call macroeconomic conditions (macrocond). A wave of empirical studies has analyzed the macroeconomic determinants of banking sector stability and banking crises. There is a broad consensus regarding the detrimental effects of adverse macroeconomic conditions on the stability of the banking sector (see, e.g., Von Hagen and Ho, 2007; Frankel and Saravelos, 2010) .
We begin with macroeconomic variables considered in, e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) or Duttagupta and Cashin (2011) : the rate of inflation (gdpdefl), the real interest rate (realint), GDP growth (gdpgr) and the fiscal balance (fisbal). In principle, higher rates of inflation and real interest rates as well as a weak GDP growth and fiscal position raise the likelihood of banking crises (see, e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Hardy and Pazarbasioglu, 1999). Since Caprio and Klingebiel (1997) find that a higher crisis probability is related to a higher volatility of output growth, we also consider GDP growth volatility (gdpvol).
Taking into account that rapid credit and money growth can lead to serious asset price misalignments and financial imbalances (Schularick and Taylor, 2009), we include credit growth (credgr) and money growth (money). Further indicator variables we consider are the deposit rate (deprate) and deposit rate volatility (depvola). Rojas-Suarez (2001) argues that low deposit rates reflect higher risk-taking behavior in the banking sector. Moreover, higher volatility of short-term interest rates can lead to fluctuations in the cost of servicing short-term liabilities and higher liquidity risk. Correspondingly, the risk of bank failures rises due to unanticipated sharp increases in short-term interest rates (Smith and Van Egteren, 2005) .
Finally, we include an indicator variable to capture the degree of financial openness (chinnito). As a measure for financial openness, we choose the de jure-index taken from Chinn and Ito (2008) which consists of four binary dummy variables that indicate the presence of multiple exchange rates, restrictions on current account transactions, restrictions on capital account transactions and the requirement of the surrender of export proceeds. In theory, financial liberalization has both its merits and drawbacks (Calderon and 
Economic freedom
At last, we include the latent variable economic freedom (ecofree) to take account of institutional factors that might influence the soundness of the banking sector. Following Gwartney and Lawson (2003) , key elements of economic freedom are personal choice, voluntary exchange, freedom to compete, and protection of persons and property. Provided that greater economic freedom enables banks to realize greater profits and better diversify their risks, this should translate into a more stable banking sector. Institutions are regarded as consistent with economic freedom when the above mentioned components are promoted. The evidence from the empirical literature tends to support the view that weak institutions have detrimental effects on economic and financial stability (see, e.g., Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998).
We include the six components from the World Banks' Good Governance Indicators: voice and accountability (vacc), political stability (pstab), government effectiveness (geff), regulatory quality (rqual), rule of law (rlaw) and control of corruption (ccorr). The indicator values range from -2.5 to +2.5, with higher values corresponding to a higher institutional quality. According to the preceding discussion, we expect that higher institutional quality leads to more stable banking systems. Furthermore, we also include two indicator variables from the Database of Political Institutions. We consider political system (system) which shows whether an economy has an assembly-elected president, a parliamentary or a presidential system. The variable executive election (exelec) indicates in which year an executive election was held. Another indicator variable aiming at the quality of political institutions is democracy (democ) which is taken from the Polity IV database. This indicator measures characteristics from political regimes, such as the presence of procedures through which citizens can express preferences about alternative policies and leaders (Marshall et al., 2009 ).
We also control for government size and deposit insurance. To address government size (govsize) we use government consumption as a share of total consumption. Economic freedom is reduced when the government spending increases at the expense of private spending. The basic idea is that personal choice is substituted by the government decision making when the government share increases (see Gwartney and Lawson, 2003) . The indicator deposit insurance scheme (depins) is a binary dummy variable that specifies whether an economy has implemented an explicit insurance scheme or not. The empirical evidence indicates that explicit deposit insurance tends to increase the probability of banking crises (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 2002).
Empirical Methodology
A structural equation model (SEM) describes statistical relationships between latent (unobservable) variables and manifest (directly observable) variables and is typically used when variables cannot be measured directly or are difficult to measure. Sets of manifest variables (also called indicator variables) are used to capture hypothetical, difficult to measure constructs as in our case financial stability or regulatory governance. Latent variables are interpreted as hypothetical constructs -the "true" A SEM consists of two parts: the structural model and the measurement models (see Bollen, 1989 or Kline, 2011 for a detailed description of the methodology). Our structural model is given by:
which represents the relationship between the latent exogenous variables ( 1 … n ) and the latent endogenous variable ( 1 ). The coefficients  11 … 14 describe the relationships between the latent exogenous variables and the latent endogenous variable. Each latent variable is determined by a set of indicator variables.  1 corresponds to the error term which measures the unexplained component of the structural model. The exogenous measurement model links the exogenous latent variables to its observable indicator variables and is represented by: 
where x 1 …x q depict the indicator variables for the exogenous latent variables.  11…  q represent the regression coefficients and the error terms are given by  1 … q . In our case the exogenous latent variables are regulatory governance, the structure of the banking sector, the macroeconomic conditions and economic freedom.
In analogy to the exogenous measurement model, the endogenous measurement model links the endogenous latent variables to its observable indicator variables. It is given by: 
where y 1 …y p are the indicator variables for the endogenous latent variable financial stability ( 1 ).  11 … p1 represent the regression coefficients and the error terms are given by  1…  p .
The parameters are estimated by using the information contained in the indicator variables' covariance matrices. The aim of the procedure is to obtain values for the parameters that produce an estimate for the models' covariance matrix that fits the sample covariance matrix of the indicator variables. We estimate our SEM in SPSS with AMOS. Figure 1 shows the path diagram for structural equation model. The latent variables are displayed in ellipses, whereas the variables in rectangular boxes represent the indictor variables for the respective latent variables and the circles depict the error terms. Single-headed arrows indicate our proposed relationships. As outlined in section 3, we assume that the endogenous latent variable financial stability ( 1 ) is affected by four exogenous latent variables regulatory governance ( 1 ), structure of the banking sector ( 2 ), macroeconomic conditions ( 3 ) and economic freedom ( 4 ). Thus, we will consider four sets of indicator variables. This is broadly consistent with recent policy and academic work on the determinants of financial stability (see, e.g., Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999 In view of the various indicator variables presented in section 3, a range of model specifications has been tested. We start from the most general specification and omit variables by applying an iterative procedure. The choice of variables is based on several criteria: the statistical significance of the estimated parameters, the parsimony of the model and the goodness-of-fit measures that will be discussed in more detail below. Nevertheless, given the vast number of possible specifications we have to exercise some judgment in order to achieve a parsimonious and reasonable model. 4 To achieve identification, it is required to normalize one of the indicator variables of each latent variable (see Bollen, 1989; Kline, 2011) . We impose a factor loading of unity on foreign competition, political central bank independence, inflation, control of corruption, and the ratio of capital to assets.
Results
The main results and the goodness-of-fit statistics are shown in table A Turning to the other latent variables, we find a positive relationship between the structure of the banking sector and banking sector stability. As expected, more open and less restricted banking systems increase the safety and soundness of the banking system. Furthermore, the results indicate that adverse macroeconomic conditions have a negative influence on banking sector stability. Thus, confirming the findings of other empirical studies, symptoms of an unstable, adverse macroeconomic environment such as rising inflations rates, a higher volatility of output growth or rising real interest rates, seem to have a negative impact on financial stability.
Perhaps surprisingly, economic freedom seems to have a negative effect on the stability of the banking sector. To be sure, greater freedoms might imply that banks engage in activities that carry higher risks. Thus, the institutional environment may induce greater risk-taking and distort the incentive structure in the banking sector so that the banking stability may be undermined (see Beck et al., 2007 for a similar line 4 The studies of, e.g., Dell'Anno et al. (2007) and Dreher et al. (2007) follow a similar procedure. 5 We experimented with a wide array of different model specifications. Specifications different from those in section 5 were estimated, but mainly led to a worsened model fit, as will be discussed in more detail below. To conserve space and to improve comprehensibility, not all specifications considered in the empirical analysis are reported but are available on request.
of reasoning). Although one should be careful when interpreting this result, it is in line with findings of previous studies. Firstly, there seems to be no evidence that higher compliance with governance standards lead to a better performance during the recent financial crisis -whether on a corporate level (Beltratti and Stulz, 2009) or in terms of country governance (Giannone et al., 2010) . To the contrary, more freedoms seemed to lead to higher risk taking. Secondly, Breuer (2006) finds that a lack of property rights reduces the level of non-performing loans which might be explained by the fact that countries lacking property rights exhibit less recognition of nonperforming loans. Thirdly, Hasan et al. (2008) find that rule of law is negatively correlated with profit efficiency in the banking sector since banks may be incentivised to invest less resources in collecting proprietary information which in turn results in suboptimal lending decisions. And lastly, Rodrik (2006) argues that empirical evidence has not been able to establish a robust causal link between any institutional feature and economic growth. He refers to the Chinese experience which demonstrates that common goals can be achieved under divergent rules.
We also report goodness-of-fit statistics. The most common test is the chi-square test. We start by reporting the ratio of chi-square to degrees of freedom (CMIN/DF). Since values of CMIN/DF  2.5 indicate a good model fit, all model specifications are accepted. However, the chi-square test has the weakness that it accepts every model if the sample size becomes sufficiently small (Blunch, 2008) . Accordingly, we resort to further fit measures. The Comparative Fit Index (CFI) is a relative fit measure which takes values between 0 and 1; a CFI value  0.9 is considered as a good fit. The CFI is larger than 0.9 in all models (except (5)), thus indicating a good fit throughout the model specifications (Bentler, 1990) . A fit measure based on the non-central chi-square distribution that provides us with evidence of an acceptable fit is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA). 6 The RMSEA value in our benchmark model is 0.61, indicating an acceptable fit; the RMSEA in the other specification is larger but still acceptable.
Regarding the fit measures based on statistical information theory, we report the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Browne-Cudeck Criterion (BCC) and the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC). These fit measures are typically employed for comparing different model specifications and provide the researcher with information for the model selection, where models with values closer to zero indicate better fit, greater parsimony and accordingly the (likely) best model (see Hair et al., 2006; Blunch, 2008) . As can be seen in table A.3 in the appendix, the best fitting and most parsimonious model is specification (3) . Nevertheless, we chose model (1) as our benchmark model since it displays the lowest RMSEA value and largest CFI value, respectively. 7 Turning to the relationships between latent and indicator variables, tables A.4 to A.8 in the appendix display the results. Most of the maximum likelihood estimated coefficients are statistically significant and have the anticipated sign. The results are fairly consistent across all model specifications.
We find a positive relationship between regulatory governance (reggov) and the variables indicating the degree of independence and accountability of regulatory authorities as well as the indices that proxy the strength of external audit and political independence of central banks. The last finding points to a more active role for central banks in the banking regulation process. The variable for the economic independence is statistically insignificant (not reported). Furthermore, the results show a positive relationship between the structure of the banking sector (bankstruc) and the variables representing bank concentration, private ownership of banks and foreign bank competition. As anticipated, the restrictiveness of bank activities enters with a negative sign. We find a negative relationship between the macroeconomic conditions (macrocond) and our inflation indicator, the real interest rate as well as deposit rate and GDP growth volatility. With respect to indicator variables not contained in the benchmark model we obtain negative signs for the deposit rates and GDP growth and a positive sign for fiscal balance (not reported) and the Chinn-Ito index measuring financial openness. Considering credit and money growth, it turns out that the coefficients' sign is negative (not reported). Both variables were omitted in the iterative process; while credit growth enters statistically insignificant, the model fit worsens considerably when adding money growth. Regarding economic freedom (ecofree), the results show that the governance indicators control of corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness enter with a positive sign. The other governance indicators not reported are also positively associated with economic freedom. Furthermore, more democratic and parliamentary systems indicate greater economic freedoms and an increasing government size is negatively related to economic freedom, while the coefficient for the deposit insurance scheme enters insignificantly. Finally, we find a negative relationship between economic freedom and executive election. 7 Note that we also employed the information-theoretic criteria in the iterative model selection process that led us to the omission of discarded models that are not reported in this paper. 8 A newly elected executive may bring profound political change associated with increasing uncertainty among market participants. A new executive could enforce significant modifications to regulatory or economic policies that constrain With regard to the financial soundness indicators (FSIs), we find a positive relationship between financial stability and all FSIs (we inverted the values of the NPLs ratio). 9 It should be noted that we omit the indicator variables Bank provisions to nonperforming loans (provtonpl) and Non-performing loans to total loans (npltotloan) from early on in the iterative model selection process. Although they both show the expected sign (not reported), they are rendered insignificant or worsen the model fit. This may be attributed to the fact that the statistics regarding the non-performing loans in a banking sector may suffer from measurement problems which are likely to increase the noise in the data analyzed since national regulatory authorities still often follow national guidelines that are not necessarily aligned (see Cihák and Schaeck, 2010) . Interestingly, the proxy most often utilized for capturing financial (in)stability in the empirical literature is the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans.
Since this empirical exercise is of exploratory nature, we qualify our results along three dimensions. First, while we acknowledge that the country sample might seem quite heterogeneous at first sight, this selection is based on two broader goals: (i) data constraints aside, we aimed for a well-balanced country sample that includes advanced, transition and developing countries and is well diversified from a geographical point of view; and (ii) the ultimate goal was to extend the scope of the sample. It is precisely for the latter reason, that we did not group the sample into subsets to achieve a higher degree of representativeness on an individual country basis. As noted by Quintyn (2007) , an important issue in building up evidence on regulatory governance is using extended data sets, since the samples used by past studies were too small, which had an impact on the robustness of the results.
Second, the flexibility offered by SEM does not make it easier to estimate (latent) variables that are difficult to measure. Thus, the construction of reliable models for the estimation of such variables is not a straightforward process (see also Bajada and Schneider, 2005 on this point).
Finally, on a more general note, one could evaluate the issue of regulatory governance by employing different empirical methods such as principal components. Basically, principal component analysis (PCA) is recommended for finding patterns in data of high dimension. While cogent arguments for PCA might be put forward, results critically depend on the scaling of the variables -a limitation not applying to SEM. More generally, SEM seems to be the economic freedoms and entail negative outcomes for the financial sector or the economy in general. 9 We experimented with different measures of financial stability from different sources. When using return on equity (roe) data from the World Banks' World Development Indicators (WDI), the model fit increases dramatically. For reasons of brevity, we only report the results using the WDI for return on equity.
appropriate statistical technique for our research goal of investigating the statistical relationship between regulatory governance and financial stability, which cannot themselves be directly measured or are difficult to measure. The fact that there are multiple indicators of financial stability and regulatory governance makes the SEM approach a better methodology for estimating the effects of regulatory governance on financial stability.The relationship between these latent variables can be simultaneously estimated within the structural model, while the indicators can be linked with the latent variable in the measurement models, thereby extracting information from different dimensions of financial stability and regulatory governance respectively.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examined whether good regulatory governance promotes a sound and stable financial sector. We employed a structural equation modeling approach to test for the relationship between regulatory governance and financial stability. Our empirical approach enables us to account for a broad range of variables potentially relevant to financial stability, employing aggregate regulatory, banking and financial, macroeconomic and institutional environment data. It allows for a number of indicators reflecting different dimensions of multidimensional variables such as financial stability or regulatory governance, providing better estimation results.
We find that regulatory governance contributes to a sound banking sector. Thus, our results suggest that the performance of bank regulation could be improved by providing the regulatory authorities with a sufficient degree of independence and accountability so that these can effectively fulfill their financial stability mandate. This is consistent with the "private interest view" to bank regulation (Barth et al., 2006) which emphasizes that regulatory authorities should be shielded from pressures from the financial sector as well as political interference.
Furthermore, financial stability depends critically on the structure of the banking sector as well as the macroeconomic and institutional conditions. Our findings indicate that a more open and less restricted banking sector is associated with an increased soundness of the banking system, while macroeconomic disturbances are negatively related to banking sector stability. Economic freedom seems to have a negative effect on the stability of the banking sector. Hence, an institutional environment that implies greater freedoms may entail higher risk-taking and a distorted incentive structure that undermines banking stability.
Our results support important policy implications. Policymakers should provide a high degree of independence to regulatory authorities so that these are able to resist political interference or the influence of financial industry lobbies. The regulatory authority should be in the position to independently exercise its judgment and powers in regulatory and supervisory activities but independence should also be reflected in the appointment and dismissal of senior staff, stable sources of agency funding, and adequate legal protection for the agencies' staff. Of equal importance, regulatory authorities have to be accountable to the executive/legislative and the financial industry, to provide public oversight, maintain legitimacy and enhance integrity. As the IMF's assessments have shown, the strengthening of regulatory governance is indeed one of the themes most in need of improvement (Vinals et al., 2010) . Thus, the improvement of regulatory governance arrangements should be a building block of financial reform since the current international regulatory framework lacks the ability to guard bank regulators from being influenced by the financial sector as well as political interference, and governance failures have been a key contributory factor to the recent financial crisis. We include a two-headed correlation arrow between the latent variables "structure of the banking sector" and "economic freedom". In the course of our iterative model selection process we tested for various correlations between the latent variables; by including this correlation arrow, we achieved the best model fit. Note: P-values in parenthesis. Significance at 10% level (*), at 5% level (**), at 1% level (***).
Regulatory Governance Note: P-values in parenthesis. Significance at 10% level (*), at 5% level (**), at 1% level (***). -0.226*** (0.000) Note: P-values in parenthesis. Significance at 10% level (*), at 5% level (**), at 1% level (***).
Macroeconomic Conditions
Economic Freedom
Specification
(1) (2) (3) (4) Note: P-values in parenthesis. Significance at 10% level (*), at 5% level (**), at 1% level (***).
Financial Stability
